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1. NOMOLOGICAL NECESSITY 
Consider the anti-Humeans’ claim that for ∀x(Fx→Gx) to be a law (or to be backed up by 
a law) there has to be a certain Must that is operating: Fs have to bring about or produce or 
necessitate Gs. Armstrong's version of this claim is to invoke nomological necessity, a 
relation that is supposed to hold between the two universals F and G—Nnom(F, G)—and, 
therefore, makes it the case that each instantiation of F is, or brings about, a G-instantiation. 
 Nomological necessity is meant to be a this-worldly, immanent relation that does not 
extend to other possible worlds: per se, the Must of nomological necessity, Nnom(F, G), 
does not bring "truth in all possible worlds" with it. It is rather to be thought of as 
something like a force operating here and now. In the lack of a better neutral technical term 
let’s call it an oomph. Whether oomphs are to be found in other worlds and, if so, are 
linking the same properties as they do actually is open for discussion in Armstrong’s view. 
Therefore, the opposite of nomological necessity should not be conceived as contingency. 
Rather, it is the lack of oomph. 
Naming the relation “necessity” suggests, of course, the following semantic link: 
that Fs nomologically necessitate Gs means that it is not possible for Fs not to be Gs. Does 
this link then reveal a hidden connection to possible world considerations? It doesn’t. We 
have to read the term nomological possibility as this-worldly as we read its necessary 
counterpart. That something is nomologically possible simply means that there is no oomph 
operating against it in the actual world. 
The force character of nomological necessity is also underlined by the guise in 
which it appears and how it is supposed to operate in the actual world. Remember, 
nomological necessity is, in itself, a second order relation between universals and has, 
therefore, prima facie not an immediate bearing on what is happening in this world. Yet, 
latest in his A World of States of Affairs (David Armstrong: A World of States of Affairs, 
Cambridge 1997) Armstrong explains how it operates: the nomological relation between 
universals is instantiated as causation. Just like the universals F and G have their 
instantiations in F-tokens and G-tokens so has the nomological necessitation universal its 
instantiation as causation between those tokens. Furthermore, Armstrong argues for the 
observability of (some instances of) causation. His paradigm case is pressures on our 
bodies. I will question neither of the two last features of causation cum nomological 
necessity and simply take them for granted. 
This is, then, where we stand so far: 
Nomic connection can be understood as the sort of connection actually encountered in 
certain cases of singular causation. (Armstrong 1997: 232). 
Singular causation is no more than the instantiation of this type of relation in particular 
cases. When we experience singular causation, what we are experiencing is nomicity, 
law-instantiation. (Armstrong 1997: 227) 
 
2. Modal Nomological Necessity 
No doubt, there is a certain temptation to use nomological necessitation as an optical device 
to get a glimpse of other worlds. Especially, when we consider counterfactual situations: 
“had there been a magnetic field the electron's trajectory would have been different”. This 
claim, so we think, is supported by the laws of nature, i.e., in the theory under scrutiny, by 
nomological necessity. However, we forget too quickly that this reasoning is elliptical for 
"assuming our laws of nature hold, had there been a magnetic field the electron's trajectory 
would have been different". We might have some sort of entailment in mind: the law 
statements plus the description of the field entail a different motion equation for the 
electron. Someone who confuses nomological necessitation with a kind of (if a little 
weaker) metaphysical necessitation would not need the tacit supposition "assuming our 
laws of nature hold". Armstrong, and other proponents of nomological necessitation, do 
need it. In short, nomological necessitation does not by itself extend to counterfactual 
situations. We have to carry it with us. Here is one canonical possibility of how to do this: 
 We can define a kind of possible worlds necessity, call it modal nomological 
necessity, on the basis of nomological necessity. Van Fraassen (Bas van Fraassen, Laws 
and Symmetry, Oxford 1989, 44) gives us a recipe for this purpose for Lewis's account of 
laws of nature which we can easily turn into a recipe for a nomological necessity account of 
laws.1 Define modal nomological possibility in the following way: 
World y is modally nomologically possible relative to world x iff the laws of x are laws 
in y and vice versa (i.e., nomological necessity links the same universals in x and y). 
 We get the notion of modal nomological necessity as a by-product: 
“It is modally nomologically necessary that A” is true in world x iff A is true in every 
world which is modally nomologically possible relative to x.2 
The argument has the following general form: knowing that Nnom(F, G) holds is a very 
good reason for us to claim that the counterfactual “were this x an F it would be a G” is 
true. In other words, we recommend that Nnom(F, G) being the case should be accepted as a 
justification for the respective counterfactual claim. 
 
3. Interlude: Nomological Necessity and the A priori 
I now come to a brief remark concerning the a priori. It has often been argued that by 
liberating the necessary from the a priori and, along with this move, by being able to give 
necessity its own, separate meaning Kripke has paved the way for anti-Humean 
nomological necessity approaches to the laws of nature. Consider, for example, Stathis 
Psillos: 
It was Kripke's liberating views in the early 1970s that changed the scene radically. By 
defending the case of necessary statements, which are known a posteriori, Kripke [1972] 
made it possible to think of the existence of necessity in nature which is weaker than 
logical necessity, and yet strong enough to warrant the label necessity. […] As a result 
of this, the then dominant view of laws as mere regularities started to be seriously 
challenged. (Stathis Psillos, Causation and Explanation, Chesham 2002, 161; my italics) 
                                                 
1 In fact, this recipe is applicable to any notion of lawhood that does not itself dependent on modal 
considerations. 
2 Laws are trivially modally nomologically possible according to these definitions: let L be a law of x. “L is a 
law” is true in every world y which is possible because the same laws are laws in y as in x qua definition of 
modally nomologically possible. 
Now, if, in Psillos’ statement, “natural necessity“ is meant to be Kripke’s metaphysical 
necessity then (as it has been shown above) it has nothing much to do with Armstrong’s 
nomological necessity. Rather, it would then relate to the theory I will deal with next, 
namely essentialism. Yet, this movement came into fashion too late to speak justifiably of 
Kripke changing the scene radically in the early 1970s. Indeed, in that case, the harvest of 
Kripke’s seed showed up rather late.  
However, if Psillos means to refer with “necessity in nature“ to a kind of 
Armstrongian nomological necessity then the comparison to logical necessity is misplaced: 
as underlined above, nomological necessity has, per se, nothing to do with this kind of 
possible world necessity and is neither weaker nor stronger. 
Hence, Kripke’s authority turns out to be limited. His influence has to be thought of 
as psychological rather than philosophical: Kripke has opened people’s minds for 
connections in nature which have been banned from philosophy since Hume, fair enough, 
but he did not yet come up with the kind of necessity Armstrong and others have envisaged 
for laws of nature. 
 
4. Essentialism and Metaphysical Necessity 
So far, it has been argued that the Must the opponents of regularity theories (here 
Armstrong) take to be essential for laws is not the Must of "truth in all metaphysically 
possible worlds" but rather the Must of causation (oomphs). Yet, this other Must, i.e., 
metaphysical necessity, is the one the new essentialists see figuring in their laws:3 
Essentialists have their own special brand of necessity. This kind of necessity has 
traditionally been called "metaphysical necessity". [It] might also be called "physical 
necessity", or "natural necessity". […] A better name would be its classical Latin name, 
"de re necessity", which might reasonably be translated as "real necessity". (Brian Ellis, 
The Philosophy of Nature, Chesham 2002, 110) 
And here is the equation of metaphysical (or real) necessity with truth in all possible 
worlds: 
Real necessity is no less strict than any other kind of necessity. […] If essentialists are 
right, and the laws of nature are really necessary, then they must be counted as necessary 
in the very strong sense of being true in all possible worlds. Truth in all possible worlds 
is the defining characteristic of all forms of strict necessity. (Ellis 2002: 110; my 
emphasis) 
"Water is H2O" is a necessary proposition in the strict sense of being true in every 
possible world. (Ellis 2002: 110) 
I will not go into details regarding the nature of metaphysical necessity. I simply appeal to 
the readers' Kripke-trained intuitions which have been rehearsed over and over again with, 
for example, the above mentioned "Water is H2O" case. The equation of metaphysical 
necessity with truth in all possible worlds is what solely matters for my purposes. 
 
5. Does the Essentialist Lose the Oomph? 
Putting together what has been said so far reveals that if the essentialists were only to 
replace the nomological necessity of laws by metaphysical necessity—Nmet(F, G) instead of 
                                                 
3 I will focus on Brian Ellis’s writings. However, next to Sydney Shoemaker, Charles Martin, George Molnar, 
Nancy Cartwright and John Heil he lists in his The Philosophy of Nature (Ellis 2002) many more followers of 
the new essentialism. 
Nnom(F, G)—then they would lose the intra-world Must.4 The pure change from 
nomological necessity to metaphysical necessity, which is very often perceived as a 
strengthening, would therefore be, in some sense, a weakening. In fact, the essentialist 
would, somehow, fall back into Humean metaphysics. The Humean mosaic of unrelated 
properties and accidental regularities is now just bigger: it expands from our world to all 
possible worlds. Within each of those worlds, however, Fs do not bring about, do not 
produce, or cause Gs. In short, at this point, essentialists would lose their oomph; a loss 
they would not want to accept. 
How do they get it back in? The following quote reveals what is no secret for those 
familiar with the essentialism debate: 
For an essentialist, causation is not essentially an illusion resulting from habits of 
thought, as it is for a Humean. There are genuine causal powers in nature of greater or 
less strength, acting on various kinds of thing, and producing many different kinds of 
effects. (Ellis 2002: 106; my italics) 
In other words, the essentialists push the oomph into their properties. That is, they argue 
that (at least some) properties are causal powers. That means, Nmet(F, G) is not enough of a 
replacement for Nnom(F, G). Also, G has to make room for a disposition D which would, in 
this case, be the power (oomph!) to bring about or cause G if certain circumstances, C, are 
met: 
What we think of as a causal power occupies the role of driving force in a causal 
relation. (Ellis 2002: 65) 
The causal processes that are involved in the detailed explanation of a given disposition 
will all have the same kind of structure. Each will be characterizable by the kind (or 
kinds) of circumstances C that would trigger or instantiate the action, and the kind (or 
kinds) of outcome(s) E that would (or would with probability p) result, provided that 
there were no interfering or distorting influences. (Ellis 2002: 77) 
Again, there are at least two replacements to be made if we want to change Armstrong’s 
theory of laws gradually into Ellis’ theory: NMet for Nnom and D for G. Nmet(F, D) is then the 
ultimate short form of the new essentialist's credo: natural kinds, such as F, have their 
powers, such as D, essentially, i.e., it is metaphysically necessary that Fs have the causal 
power D. Compare this short form to a lengthier statement: 
Today's essentialists suppose that the basic dispositions of things to interact with each 
other in the way in which they do derive from the intrinsic causal powers, capacities and 
propensities of their most fundamental constituents. They suppose that these causal 
powers, and the like, are among the essential properties of things of these kinds, and 
therefore properties that things of these kind have necessarily, since they could not 
possibly fail to have them, while yet being things of these kinds. (Ellis 2002: 13) 
 
6. The Bookkeeper and the Lumberjack 
                                                 
4 Note that Nmet(F, G) is not really a valid way to formalize the shift. Metaphysical necessity, Nmet, is a 
property of propositions (or facts, or states of affairs, or whichever you prefer). It is not a relation which can 
be attributed to ordered pairs of universals. To resolve the trouble we can, at least as a working hypothesis, 
turn to the respective regularity statements and apply the necessity operator to them: Nmet(∀x(Fx→Gx)). As a 
matter of convenience, I will nonetheless allow myself to write Nmet(F, G) where no confusion can arise. (I 
also ignore worlds in which only one or none of the universals F and G exists.) 
It is interesting to note that laws, in the essentialists’ view, occupy quite a different role 
from the one they played in Armstrong’s theory. For the essentialist, laws are somehow 
condemned to do the bookkeeping: the sum of them is the worlds inventory list which tells 
us in which natural kind (or universal) we find which disposition (or, metaphorically 
speaking, in which box we find which tool). There is no messing about, fair enough: the 
inventory list is stone engraved, that is, the laws are metaphysically necessary. 
Bookkeepers, however, are no men of action (they are lacking the appropriate muscles). 
Clearly, someone else has to do the hard work: the cutting, pushing, chopping, tearing. But 
we know who now fulfills this role—that is, the lumberjack’s role—: dispositions. 
 
7. Do the Powers have Modal Force? 
I have already lined out how we can get a modal force from Armstrong’s nomological 
necessity—a feature this kind of necessity does not have per se. My argument was that 
Nnom(F, G) actually being the case is a sufficient reason to assume that if something were an 
F it would also be a G. Nnom(F, G) justifies this kind of counterfactual reasoning, every 
hundredth F accidentally being G would not. 
 Can a similar force be extracted from the dispositionalist’s powers? Very easily!5 
We are concerned with the question whether the counterfactual “if this thing had the 
disposition D and were triggered with C it would react with G” is supported by the 
essentialists’ story about dispositions. And of course it is, simply because dispositional 
predicates entail counterfactual conditionals of precisely the required kind qua their 
meaning. 
 Note that this is an uncontroversial claim about dispositional predicates whether you 
are a realist about dispositions or not. Maybe you want to add that the counterfactuals also 
entail the disposition and that therefore dispositions are reducible to counterfactual 
conditionals, or maybe you want to say that dispositions are irreducible and basic.6 Clearly, 
no-one can deny the link pointing from the predicate to the counterfactual.7 Remember 
Ellis: 
Each [disposition] will be characterizable by the kind (or kinds) of circumstances C that 
would trigger or instantiate the action, and the kind (or kinds) of outcome(s) E that 
would (or would with probability p) result, provided that there were no interfering or 
distorting influences. (Ellis 2002: 77)8 
                                                 
5 Remember that, here, we are not concerned with the essentialists’ claim that some properties’ possession of 
some powers is metaphysically necessary: (Nmet(F, G)). For that case it is agreed that we get the modal force 
for free because metaphysical necessary simply is truth in all possible worlds. 
6 David Lewis aims for such a reduction to counterfactuals (cf. David Lewis: Finkish Dispositions, in: 
Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997), 143-158) where Ellis insists that the counterfactual entailed by a 
dispositional predicate serves, at best, as a rough characterisation of the disposition (cf. Ellis 2002: 76-7, 79). 
The counterfactual captures a symptom of the disposition, not its essence. 
7 In pre-philosophical discourse we often want to draw attention to the truth of counterfactual conditionals 
when we attribute dispositions to objects. Think of the label “Fragile” on carton boxes. It is supposed to 
imply: “Handle with care because if you don’t the content will break”. 
8 I ignore Ellis’s addendum “provided that there were no interfering or distorting influences”. It is, however, 
clear that there is a bomb ticking under the cover of proviso clauses like this. 
Hence, if the essentialists describe something as having the disposition D to G if C-ed they 
are not only postulating causal oomphs but they thereby provide us with an analytical 
inference ticket to counterfactual reasoning. Both the oomph and the permission for 
counterfactual reasoning (which had to be added as an extra to Armstrong’s theory) is 
condensed into the disposition. In short, saying that something x has disposition D is saying 
that counterfactual reasoning is justified because x has the respective causal oomph. 
 I conclude that whichever of the two theories we prefer, Armstrong’s or Ellis’s, we 
can extract our modal force from a supposed intra world causal connection. Earlier, I called 
this modal force “modal nomological necessity”. 
 
8. Where do we go from here? 
If my considerations are correct we have gained a modal concept different from and 
competing with the original Kripkean necessity: we have metaphysical necessity and we 
have modal nomological necessity.  
A natural sequel to this paper would start to compare features of the two modal 
necessities. However, at this place is only room left for a brief outline of these features 
which could guide such an enquiry: 
• We might want to argue that modal nomological necessity deserves the title of a 
“necessity in nature“ (i.e., a de re necessity) more than the Kripkean necessity for it 
is based on causation where the latter is partially dependent on our intuitions about 
reference. 
• According to Armstrong, the instantiation of nomological necessity is causation and 
causation can be felt or observed in certain cases. Metaphysical necessitation, on the 
other hand, is, although discovered a posteriori, not directly observable. It remains 
theoretical to a large extend. The necessity of water being H2O goes unnoticed. 
• Due to its bookkeeping nature Kripkean metaphysical necessity has similarities to 
analyticity (de dicto necessity). Analyticity keeps meanings in order, metaphysical 
necessity mirrors this semantic feature in nature. The modal correlate of 
nomological necessity, on the other hand, arranges the temporal order of events. 
• Following the last point, it becomes obvious that there is a temporal succession or a 
diachronic component in modal nomological necessity which metaphysical 
necessity lacks. The later is a static, synchronic business. 
• Finally, there are two features linked to both dispositions and causal relations which 
seem to be irreconcilable with modal forms of necessity: some dispositions and 
some causation is probabilistic, and, worse, there is the infamous problem of 
proviso clauses related to causation and dispositions: the power manifests if 
triggered “provided that there [are] no interfering or distorting influences.” (Ellis 
2002: 77) Modal necessity, in contrast, does not allow for provisos. 
 
